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ORIGEN ON TIME 
Jay LAMPERT 
RÉSUMÉ : Les concepts platoniciens d'émanation et de retour suggèrent une philosophie de l'his-
toire comparable à celle de Hegel, mais d'une manière purement formelle. Origène introduit 
dans la forme de l'histoire des événements actuels : la création, la chute et la rédaction des 
Écritures. Sa relecture des hypostases néoplatoniciennes — l'Un, l'Intellect et l'Âme — 
comme Monde, Volonté et Interprétation, manifeste comment des événements historiques ac-
quièrent une signification transcendantale. 
SUMMARY : Neo-Platonic concepts of emanation and return suggest a philosophy of history com-
parable to Hegel's, but in a purely formal way. Origen introduces some actual events into the 
form of history : the creation, the fall, and the writing of scripture. His rewritings of the neo-
Platonic hypostases — the One, the Intellect, and the Soul — as World, Will, and Interpreta-
tion, show how historical events achieve transcendental significance. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
1. Conditions for a philosophy of time 
I t is one thing to have a philosophy that says something about time, and another thing to have a philosophy that emphasizes time. A philosophy that emphasizes 
time would hold that the reason time deserves ontological emphasis is that transcen-
dental or categorical or a priori truths emerge and develop over time, particularly the 
time of human events. Thus, for example, the French Revolution is for Hegel an 
event with transcendental significance, during which a new kind of freedom and a 
new kind of reason (a self-conscious kind) were made possible in the world. This 
temporal event is held to have changed not only human culture and human nature, 
but the ontology of the cosmos. Pushed to its limits, the implication is that any event 
might conceivably be an event with transcendental significance, redefining the onto-
logical categories under which all succeeding events, and in a certain sense all pre-
ceding events too, have to be interpreted. On such an account, while there is nothing 
that exists outside of time, there are events within time which extend backward and 
forward throughout time, and hence function as transcendental, even as eternal, cate-
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gories across time. The problem for a philosophy of time is to explain how tempo-
rally transitory events are also eternal, to show how events stand out in time without 
positing a standpoint outside time.1 
2. Christian neo-Platonism and Origen's text 
The systematic philosophers of history of the 19th Century, as well as their 20th 
Century deconstructive critiques, have their source largely in 3rd Century neo-
Platonism. Plotinus's version of neo-Platonism describes a history of emanation and 
return, where the One radiates into the many : the One expresses itself in intellect 
(nous), intellect differentiates itself into souls, soul projects itself into a natural envi-
ronment, and then as humans we have a responsibility to look back up the ladder that 
has emanated into us, and in this backward reference we actually restore the unity of 
the One in the end. This constitutes a scheme for a philosophy of history in the full 
sense, a scheme in which everything about a phenomenon consists of its place in a 
process of development, and in which all knowledge and self-knowledge consists of 
a knowledge of the world's history. However, for Plotinus, the scheme for a philoso-
phy of history remains an ideal history. Plotinus is not interested in any actual events 
in chronological succession. Early Christian neo-Platonism adds at least a few actual 
historical events — the creation of the world, the incarnation of Christ, the last Judg-
ment — to the scheme of emanation and return. The neo-Platonist offers a logic of 
history and the Christian offers some actual events. I am therefore looking at Origen, 
the 3rd Century Christian neo-Platonist, to see how what I have called a fully devel-
oped philosophy of time emerges. 
Origen's most systematic philosophical text, written in Alexandria around 220 
CE., is called Peri Archon in the original Greek, translated into Latin as De Princip-
iis, and hence into English as On First Principles.2 Perhaps a more direct translation 
would be On Beginnings, or even On Senses of Firstness. I will not be examining 
here the historical influences (ranging from obvious sources in Platonism and Chris-
tianity to less frequently discussed sources in Jewish theology and traditional Egyp-
1. The English text is ORIGEN, On First Principles (translated by G.W. Butterworth, 1936) ; NY : Harper and 
Row, 1966. I will refer to the text according to Book, chapter, and section. References to the Greek and 
Latin texts are to Paul KOETSCHAU (éd.), Origenes Werke, V, Die Griechischen Christlichen Schriftsteller, 
Leipzig : J.C. Hinrichs'sche Buchhandlung, 1913. I have limited myself in this paper to Peri Archon, 
though Origen's fifty page analysis of the phrase "in the beginning" in his Commentary on the Gospel of 
John is clearly relevant to the philosophy of time, as are Origen's polemics against the Stoics, Gnostics, 
Aristotelians, and other heretics, in his Contra Celsus. 
2. The idea of reading neo-Platonic and medieval philosophies of time and history as texts analyzing the same 
issues later analyzed by Hegelian and post-Hegelian hermeneutics is of course an old one. One could say 
that Schelling himself got his start with this strategy. For helpful recent examples, see Peter MANCHESTER, 
"Time and Soul in Plotinus, III 7 [45], 11", in Dionysius, 2 (Dec. 1978), p. 101-136. Also see the many re-
lated papers by Kenneth SCHMITZ, including "A moment of Truth : Present Actuality", Review of Meta-
physics, 33 (June 80), p. 673-688. I would also like to thank John RUSSON (Acadia University) for detailed 
analysis of earlier versions of this paper, as well as for dozens of conversations, and I would like to thank 
Emil PlSCATELLI (Northern Virginia Community College) for commenting on this paper at the Washington 
Philosophy Club, and for insightful comments on the relation between neo-Platonism and Christian theol-
ogy. 
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tian thought), but I do want very briefly to set out five common 3rd Century prob-
lems in the philosophy of time. 
3. Five Third Century Problems of Time 
Whether the world begins and ends in time. Some argue that the world has no 
beginning in time (Aristotelians), some that it has a beginning but no end (Platonists, 
drawing on the Timaeus), and others that it has a beginning which is somehow non-
temporal (Philo, the First Century Jewish neo-Platonist, from whom Origen, and Ori-
gen's teacher Clement, draw extensively). However, just saying that the world begins 
in time does not mean that one is emphasizing time as an ontological category. In-
deed, if the beginning of the world involves the beginning of time, the cause of that 
beginning would have to be outside time, which subordinates time to something else. 
But if the beginning of the world occurs within time, we have the familiar question of 
what the cause of the world was doing before He created, and why He chose that 
time rather than another time. The awkwardness of these questions forces us to look 
for a different sort of interpretation of the problem of the beginning of the world. On 
my reading, the idea of the beginning of the world in time has to be interpreted not as 
a particular dated moment, but as a characteristic of all time, namely that there is a 
way in which time can be comprehended as a totality with a single principle of unity. 
How real is worldly time relative to the eternal ? Plato's doctrine that being is 
eternal whereas time is a characteristic only of becoming dominates much of 3rd 
Century thought. Plato's phrase "time is the moving image of eternity" is in fact am-
biguous. It may entail that time is only an image, and therefore unreal. Boethius 
{Consolation of Philosophy v.6) and Augustine (Confessions Book 11) later take this 
approach, arguing in different ways that time exists for the soul only. On the other 
hand, it might entail that worldly time is an instance of a Platonic Form of time, i.e. a 
form of the before-after relation (as Simplicius suggests in On Aristotle's Physics). 
Or it might entail a positive assessment of time as the medium in which the One is 
gradually expressed (e.g. Plotinus Ennead 3.7). 
The role of the soul in the measurement of time. Aristotle says that time is the 
measure of movement (Physics 218b). This measurement scheme needs a reliable 
counter, and the soul is the best candidate (Physics 223a 15-28). Augustine later ar-
gues that time exists only in the soul. But there is another way to think of the role of 
soul in time, and that is to think of soul not so much as that which subjectively expe-
riences time, but as that which objectively projects itself forward in time, namely 
through acts of will. 
Past-now-future : Points vs. continuities. The Stoics argue that since the Now 
vanishes as soon as it arises, only past and future are real (Plutarch, SVF II, 519). 
Augustine, on the contrary, argues that the present does exist, but past and future do 
not, on the grounds that they do not exist now. Both of these implausible conclusions 
about which points exist and which do not rest on the assumption that time consists 
of points. Aristotle argues that time is rather a continuous stretch, on which past, pre-
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sent, and future are only potentially divisible points of reference (Physics 222a 24-
222b 8). 
Providence and the unfolding of events. The idea that time measures not just a 
succession of distinct points but the unfolding of the inner purpose of events is ex-
pressed in the Stoic doctrine that "things which are to be do not suddenly spring into 
existence, but the evolution of time is like the unwinding of a cable ; it creates noth-
ing new but only unfolds each event in its order" (Cicero, SVF II, 944). The idea of 
unfolding truth gives some sense to the doctrine of Apostolic succession (the doctrine 
that at any given time there is one and only one head of the church, and that any 
dogma spelled out at the beginning of church history is inviolable), a doctrine that 
without this sense of unfolding history would seem implausible in the extreme. What 
unfolds in church history is not only an event but an interpretation.3 
The 3rd Century problems of time thus exhibit time in relation to three spheres : 
time in world events, time in acts of will, and time in interpretation. While Origen's 
Peri Archon is not neatly divided,4 these are also Origen's three primary topics of 
concern : the problems of the beginning of the world, the beginning of acts of will, 
and the beginning of interpretation. The first involves God's creation, the second in-
volves the fall of man, the third involves the method for reading scripture. Together 
they fit into a dialectical analysis of time. We will move from seeing time as driven 
by a succession of momentary occurrences, to seeing time as purposive continuity re-
ferring forward and backward, to seeing time as the interpretative focus that tele-
scopes whole histories around single events, bunching time up around certain nodes, 
and giving transcendental significance to events immanent in time. 
II. FIRST CAUSE OF THE WORLD 
1. Beginnings beyond time : "never not" 
Origen's text begins with God the Father, Christ, and the Holy Spirit. God is the 
"first principle of all things" (1.1.6), therefore indivisible, therefore incorporeal. But 
although God's firstness means simple unity, Origen says, we cannot believe that 
"God the Father ever existed, even for a single moment, without begetting his wis-
3. Henri CROUZEL argues that "In Origen's view the history of the Church is co-extensive with that of the ra-
tional beings", (Origen (translated by A.S. Worrall), San Francisco : Harper and Row, Publishers, 1989, 
p. 219). Crouzel's idea is that the past is the history of the pre-existent souls of Christians, the present is a 
history of the daily life of Christians, and the future is a history of the resurrection of Christians. In my 
view, the emphasis on Church history here does not divert attention from philosophical to theological con-
cerns, as it might in other contexts, but rather situates the issues of human community and temporal sys-
tematic in a unified framework. 
4. Ibid. Crouzel argues throughout that Origen is not a systematic philosopher but an experimenter and a 
mystic. It is true that the received text of Origen's work has been corrupted by early editors and critics 
(Rufinus and Jerome in particular), it is true that Peri Archon is repetitive and sometimes seems disorgan-
ized, and it is true that Origen often insists that some of his conclusions are uncertain and await further de-
bate. On the other hand, my view is that the test of whether Origen is a systematic philosopher is whether a 
systematic reading of his texts can solve philosophical problems. 
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dom" (1.2.2). Thus firstness has built into it a secondness, an act of beginning, an ex-
pression, namely Christ. This second, the "firstborn" (1.2.1) does not include any-
thing that was not already in the first (1.2.13), and is in no way less than the first 
(1.3.7). This expression of the first must then consciously reflect the Father, namely 
as the Holy Spirit. This too follows from the first (1.3.4). The creation is not like an 
"emanation of particles", which implies division, or like one thing changing into an-
other thing, or like the generation of something from nothing (4.4.1). It is rather a 
"becoming", as a father becomes the father of a son (4.4.1). 
Most of this is common neo-Platonism. What I want to focus on is the idea that 
"there is no time when it [the image of unity, or the Son of God] did not exist" 
(1.2.9). We are dealing here with non-temporal creation, a beginning that was "never 
not" (e.g. 1.4.3, 2.3.5, 3.5.2, 4.4.1). Creation is "begotten beyond the limits of any 
beginning" (1.2.2). But how can the world be begotten but not begun ? 
The simple answer seems to be in Origen's suggestion that we disregard any hint 
of "temporal significance" in the phrases "never not" or "always" (1.3.4, 4.4.1). But 
how exactly are we supposed to remove the time-element from the concept of "never 
not" ? At least in connotation, "never not" has a different sense than "always", or 
even "always already". As a method of canceling out the temporality of the begin-
ning, the function of "never not" is to drive the moment of beginning backwards be-
yond any given point. In short, the only way to think of the timeless elements of the 
beginning is to think of a temporal regress and to push it back infinitely. But isn't this 
strange ? God begins his creation, but then cancels the createdness of that creation. 
Or better, creation is an activity whose nature is to be repeated without end. 
As ongoing activity, the timeless beginning is always active, it has always al-
ready made itself known, and creations always already have a prior history leading 
up to them which had never not yet begun. And of course the same goes for the end : 
whatever the purpose of creation, it has never not yet been completed. Nevertheless, 
these beginnings and ends that push backwards and forwards infinitely along lines of 
events depend somehow on those lines of events. We have to see how beginnings 
fully in time make up the sequence across which timeless beginnings are pushed. 
2. Time and difference : the end is like the beginning 
The beginning of the Trinity is timeless, but the beginnings of diversified indi-
viduals are beginnings that do occur in time, and they need to be explained. Why 
does God create them ? It is one thing for God to create direct expressions co-existent 
with Himself, but why would he create lesser beings separate from Himself ? This is 
a question difficult for any neo-Platonist. It is even worse for Plotinus, whose first 
principle is the One. How could the One produce a second ? If the one is truly one, 
how can manness come out of it ? The only hope of a solution for either Plotinus or 
Origen is to reverse the question, to start not with the pre-creation state of the One, 
but with the already created diverse individuals and to ask why these are here now. 




The diversity of the products of the first principle is in a sense an embarrassment. 
The first thing Origen wants to explain is why this diversity of temporally distinct 
things is only temporary. Even now, he says, the diversity makes up an "immense 
animal held together by the power and reason of God" (2.1.3). And in the end, the 
unity from the beginning will be restored. When all are "subjected to Christ", "the 
last enemy will be destroyed" (1.6.2, citing 1 Cor. xv 24-27). Origen identifies this 
"last enemy" not only as Satan, but also as death, and as diversity itself. Hence in the 
end "there will no longer be any diversity" (3.6.4). And in so far as diverse things are 
finite and finite things have ends, or deaths, death itself will die, and ends will end in 
the end. Further, in order for the end to end diversity, that would have to have been 
prefigured before the beginning of the diversity (1.2.4). In theological terms, the 
Word prefigures the resurrection. In eschatological terms, the soul is immortal 
through its nature (4.4.9). In cosmological terms, "the end is always like the begin-
ning" (1.6.2 and elsewhere). 
The doctrine that the end is like the beginning is difficult to interpret. On the sur-
face it seems that the destruction of diversity should mean that at the end of time the 
diversity of the world and its temporal changes, namely everything in between begin-
ning and end, is erased, as though it never happened. 
But while Origen occasionally seems to argue for this exact identity of what there 
is before the beginning of the temporal world and what there is after the end of it, on 
important points he describes a difference between the two states. For example, while 
souls have no bodies at all before the temporal world they will have spiritual bodies 
afterwards (2.3.7).5 The end of time is the time for souls to go back to the "lecture 
room" (2.11.6), to undergo gradual improvement. In short, the end is more a matter 
of reestablished harmony than of undifferentiated unity. But now what does this 
mean for the identity of the end with the beginning, given that the end does include a 
kind of diversity that was not present at the beginning. It means first of all that just as 
Origen described the beginning by pushing back infinitely through time, so when he 
declares that the end is a destruction of time, what he is doing is referring forward 
through time. The mutual reference of beginning and end does not then entail their 
strict identity, and does not cancel out the time in between ; it entails rather a theory 
of the double movement of time forward and backward. The beginning-end identity 
makes us think the harmony at the end as the starting point for our own time. In thus 
"contemplating the beginning from the end" (1.6.2), we are to think about the process 
by which diverse things aim at inner unity. We are to think of the final goal of har-
mony as the cause that pulls our imperfect temporal world towards it. The beginning 
of diversity is a consequence of the end-results of diversity. Causality works in re-
verse. 
5. It is difficult to know exactly what Origen thought was going to happen in the soul's future. Cf. Henry 
CHADWICK, "Origen, Celsus, and the Resurrection of the Body", Harvard Theological Review, XLI, 2 
(April 1948), p. 83-102. 
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3. The gap that time falls into 
In addition to all the things that were never not, Origen is quite clear that the 
world begins to exist "at a definite time" (3.5.1). His basic argument for the begin-
ning of the world is that God can only "comprehend" a finite world (1.9.1). And 
since only something with a beginning and end is finite, the world must have a be-
ginning and end (also 3.5.2). For the finite world, Origen does not let the beginning 
drift backward in time into the "never not", but on the contrary defines the beginning 
as a moment "before everything else", a point at which things exist "when before 
they did not exist" (1.9.2). The beginning is an instant, a now-point without a prede-
cessor, but with at least one successor. From that point on things and events are num-
bered, measured, bodily, temporal, and in all ways finite, limited, and incomplete. 
Now, since whatever is created was once not, there can be nothing in its nature to 
guarantee that it always exists. Hence whatever is created in the first moment can be 
changed, and this entails at least potentially a second state of the world, and therefore 
a second moment in time, which entails a third, and so on. In short, anything that 
might once not have been is incomplete, and as the gaps within it are filled, time 
spreads from points to continua. 
Now here is the surprise. Since the world had a beginning in time, and since God 
was never not creative (1.2.10), God must have been creating before this world be-
gan. That is, before the beginning of this world, there must have been prior worlds ; 
and after this world, more worlds (2.3.5). 
4. Worlds before and after 
The reason Origen had for positing a beginning to the world was that God could 
not comprehend a single infinite world. Now he says there are an infinite number of 
finite worlds. How can God comprehend them all ? If we presume that Origen is not 
just contradicting himself in an obvious way, we have to think of the whole issue dif-
ferently. The problem of the relation between within-world time, which cannot be in-
finite, and relations between worlds, which can be, is the problem of reconciling the 
fact that we comprehend events only by organizing them into local orderings with at 
least provisional starting- and ending-points with the fact that times stretch back infi-
nitely into the past. To put the matter in this way secularizes the theory somewhat, 
treating all comprehensible events as in a sense the beginnings of a new world which 
make successions comprehensible from that point onward, while at the same time 
potentially referring back still further to prior beginnings and ends. But all that we 
can say so far is that the infinity of past time is at once affirmed and blocked, and that 
the finite world's simultaneous continuity with, and incommensurability with, the in-
finite, takes place in temporal moments called "beginnings". Or in other words, cer-
tain temporal moments have the dual character of being within a certain series, and of 
being at the threshold between two or more temporal series. 
There is a particularly messy question concerning whether souls cross the 
boundaries between worlds (2.9.7). Other questions, concerning whether there will be 
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more worlds even after the Resurrection, whether Christ is crucified in every world 
(2.3.5), whether several worlds can be exactly alike (2.3.4), and so on, are all awk-
ward. The big question is whether the succession of worlds together end in a more fi-
nal end than the kind of end that is followed by a beginning. 
At one level, Origen is just involved in a temporal regress that he is trying to 
deny, and no answer to any of these questions is likely to succeed. Nevertheless, 
there is something correct about what he is trying to do here, and something unavoid-
able about the mess he finds himself in. The problem is to articulate what sort of 
principle could circumscribe all times within a single totality. Origen's sense of the 
end of the succession of all worlds, a time when God will be "all in all" (1 Cor xv 28, 
one of Origen's favorite passages), a "period when all things are no longer in an age" 
(2.3.5), suggests a kind of super-world. At one point he says that the perfect, post-end 
world is "contained" within the limits of this world (2.3.6), but at another point in the 
same passage he reverses the containment relation, and says that the perfect world 
contains all the imperfect ones. What can it mean to say that a period after time con-
tains all times and yet is separated from those times by time ? It has to mean first that 
all times are guaranteed in advance to be related to all others in before-after relations. 
This guarantee cannot be founded on any particular succession of events, and the 
standpoint from which all events can be seen as a unified development can never be 
fully achieved as long as more events are still to come. The post-end container thus 
idealizes a standpoint in principle for synthesizing all times and beginnings into one 
sequence. Yet at the same time our time does contain this perfect totality. For the 
unity of times before and after this time is already present now, though only by virtue 
of the fact that this time now is projected toward a future which ends the uncertainty 
of the present and begins our own looking back over our history. In sum, the doctrine 
of the last world or of the container world represents the idea of a standpoint within 
time from which to survey time as a whole. Our time sends us toward a timeless 
standpoint, yet a standpoint whose relation to us is a temporal one. 
The theory of multiple worlds on the one hand allows time to be understood as an 
unbroken and orderly succession, every event bounded by predecessors and succes-
sors. But on the other hand it creates knotted points in the borders between worlds, 
reversals in the ends that precede time and the beginnings that follow them, and unre-
solvable ambiguities in the relation between the unification of time and time itself. 
Time both refers to, and blocks, a timeless world overlooking all times. Time locates 
each event in an order that is both a mere succession of moments and a transcenden-
tal standpoint. 
5. Why this now ? 
Directing the question of time to the question of the beginning of the world helps 
to exhibit the relation between local times and the totality of times. But it does not re-
solve the problem of why differentiated substances existing in time should be created 
in the first place. The only explanation of a differentiated world that Origen can give 
is that God is induced to create multiple beings as a punishment for their sins (1.8.2). 
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The question of how the world begins is thus transformed into the question of why 
individuals will to fall differently. The beginning of time is the result not of imper-
sonal cause but of personal agency. 
III. FIRST AGENCY OF THE WILL 
1. The will to time 
Origen sometimes describes Christ as the will of God's mind (1.2.6). Creation in 
general is a kind of decision. In order to consider will as the first principle that begins 
the world, we do not necessarily have to think of God anthropomorphically as a per-
son who decides what the world will be. We could instead think of the world as con-
taining projects, decisive moments, histories with momentum, and so on, and think of 
the temporal world as the system of these purposive unfoldings. To talk of creation of 
the temporal world in this context would be to talk of willing subjects choosing to fall 
into specific bodily actions at specific times. 
Souls become negligent (1.4.1, 2.9.6, 1.5.3), Origen says, and because of this 
vanity receive bodies (1.5.3) as punishment (1.8.1) and thus begin a history of decline 
(3.5.4) which descends to complete evil and materiality if not reversed by another act 
of will (1.8.4). Before actually deciding to fall, he says, all rational natures must have 
had an equal capacity for good and evil, otherwise they would not deserve praise or 
blame (1.7.2, 2.6.5). The problem for this account is obvious : if souls are scrupu-
lously made all the same, why would they fall differently ? 
The scriptures speak of "invisible enemies" working against us (3.2.1). Does that 
mean that these enemies make some of us sin ? Origen's answer is to say that the 
demons do not begin our sins, but that we "supply the occasion and beginning for our 
sins and the hostile powers spread them if possible endlessly" (3.2.2). Acts of will are 
the starting-points whose inevitable consequences spread forwards into a temporal 
future. Of course this still does not explain why souls fall differently ; it only de-
scribes how histories emerge from souls that are already marked by a first difference. 
And worse, if a soul's life begins because of something it does during that life, then 
the fall is explained only by the history that results from it.6 To test this interpretation, 
we must analyze Origen's philosophy of will. 
2. Will : image, impulse, judgment, and movement 
All living things have souls (2.8.1), which means that they "move from within 
themselves" (3.1.2). The soul's movement begins with images, which includes 
thoughts, memories, and other perceptual contents. The image then "calls forth" the 
6. There is something clearly correct about Antonia TRlPOLITIS's statement that according to both Origen and 
Plotinus, "the soul had its origin outside of time, in the realm of the intelligible or divine" (The Doctrine of 
the Soul in the Thought of Plotinus and Origen, New York : Libra Publishers, Inc., 1978, p. 141). Never-
theless, it is hard to see how the soul's responsibility for that origin could be other than something it does 
during its temporal life. 
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second faculty, namely the "impulse" to actualize the image "in an orderly manner". 
Origen's example involves a spider which first imagines weaving a web and conse-
quently wants to do so. Modern rationalists usually hold that an image is neutral, and 
can equally give rise to desire or repulsion, but Origen says that the very nature of the 
image entails a desire for the imaged object. Now, Origen says, we cannot help our 
impulses, but we do not have to assent to them. Here reason or judgment accepts or 
rejects the image according to a rational contemplation of good and evil. Once reason 
has assessed the best image to pursue, the faculty of "choice" lets us use our power of 
movement by ourselves, and because of this, we are deserving of praise or blame 
(3.1.20). 
The seductress can therefore be resisted, especially with practice (3.1.4). The 
element of practice and of the graduated degrees of judgment and the possibility of 
improving one's habitual resources and perseverance is the time element in will. 
Good judgment refers will forward through time toward the actualization of good im-
ages whereas mistaken judgment backslides forward through time. But how do we 
know in the present what is good ? If we have already got bad habits, how can we 
ever start making judgments that are not just excuses for more indulgence ? 
3. Pharaoh's hardened heart and the regressive history of deeds 
Why does scripture say that God hardened Pharaoh's heart (3.1.7) ? Didn't that 
rob him of his free will ? It is of course out of the question for God to blame someone 
for His own actions. There is only one solution. Pharaoh must already have been so 
"completely disobedient" that he already would not have done the right thing even if 
God had not prevented his heart from choosing the right thing. God's hardening of 
Pharaoh's heart simply codifies Pharaoh's previous decisions (3.1.8). The decisive 
moment of an act of will does not take place in the present, but has always taken 
place in the past. Like all of Origen's first principles, the agency of the will is regres-
sive : Pharaoh's heart is hard now because of earlier decisions ; the earlier decisions 
express still earlier decisions, and so on. This regressive deferral to past choosing 
might seem like the worst possible philosophical problem to be stuck with. On the 
other hand, there is no way out of it. A theory of will cannot avoid the problem of re-
gress ; the question is how to handle the problem. 
The point to start with is that the regress of responsibility means that an act of 
will is not an isolated moment but a history of deeds. Pharaoh's hard heartedness 
consists of his inability to break out of his habit of destroying Jews. In other words, it 
consists of his failure to make the judgment to resist the images that normally come 
into the mind of a Pharaoh. How does one learn to filter out the errors of the past ? 
Through education. What is education ? For Origen, education is rehabilitation — 
punishment for past misdeeds. 
After death, Origen says, each soul's sin determines the character of the fire it 
will burn in. This is not a tormenting fire, but a kind of "conscience" to "accuse and 
witness against itself. This self-witnessing (or self-consciousness) brings to "mem-
ory" a "history of its evil deeds" (2.10.5). In this "lecture-room for souls" (2.11.6), 
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we are instructed gradually in principles of judgment and ultimately will have re-
ceived "better precepts" (3.6.9). When does one learn to become self-conscious of 
one's history ? 
We must not expect a quick fix. At no point is progress guaranteed (3.1.5), but 
somewhere in the future is the precept that would have let us make our present judg-
ment properly. The future contains that which we will be taught as a result of the 
punishment we receive for not having been taught it yet.7 No doubt it will be a long 
time before we can discern which events in our history to resist and which to repeat. 
Meanwhile time is passing. Isn't there something a moral agent can do even now, 
caught up in his history, to rejudge that history from within, to make a fresh start, to 
transform the error that is history into the present that is the future, in short to consti-
tute a self-caused self-conscious judgment of his own history ? 
4. S elf-causality 
In order to judge between the good and bad in the history of our deeds, we have 
to read that history forward into their just outcomes. But of course that forereading 
could end in error if we desire the wrong outcomes (2.11.4). That is, if we desire 
physical or intellectual pleasures, we will foresee killing Jews or studying Plato re-
spectively, and we will pursue them without realizing that such pleasure is punish-
ment in God's eyes. The first thing we have to learn about our own futures is what 
we in the future will finally desire that future to be like.8 In short, it is the history and 
future of our own judgments that we must be making a judgment about. Judgment is 
self-caused because the history of judgments is the subject-matter for the judgments 
that begin our lives as agents. 
Everyone, says Origen, desires to know the meaning and purpose of mysterious 
events, from the meaning of the Trinity and the cause of evil (4.2.7) to the reason 
why we have so many hairs on our heads and not more (2.11.5). This wonder is not 
idle curiosity but the will to know our place in history so far. Will here is not the in-
determinacy of a choice that could go either way but a self-determination that suc-
ceeds if it makes an accurate interpretation of one's place in history. Will is in the 
end a matter of interpretation. To know what to do a person has to know how close 
he is to the end of his history, so that he can know whether his desires are to be fol-
7. For Jean DANIÉLOU, the issue here is to explain why Christ did not come earlier than he did, and his answer 
is that we had first to prepare for and deserve it (Origen (translated by Walter Mitchell), New York : Sheed 
and Ward, 1955, p. 119). But clearly to deserve it, we must have been able to know the right way to pre-
pare in advance. At the very least, we must have been able to know that the past had to be overcome, which 
is to say that we must have been able to regard the past as a Fall : "The principle of the Fall is the same law 
that we saw operating in the theology of history when the Jews refused to leave their past behind them. The 
spirit stands for progress, and by definition evil is the refusal to accept progress" (p. 213). The Fall is justi-
fied as a form of preparation. But it will take human freedom to break the repetitions of the past for the 
sake of progressive history. (See also Mircea ELIADE, The Myth of the Eternal Return, Princeton, New Jer-
sey : Princeton University Press, 1954, p. 132.) 
8. The education that prepares us to know what we knew before is after all the return to Nous. Jean 
TROUILLARD, referring to the "antinomies" of priority in Plotinus, shows how the conversion of the future 
into an origin is a kind of rupture (La Procession plotinienne, Paris : Presses Universitaires de France, 
1955, p. 45, 61-63, and elsewhere). 
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lowed or not. We first looked at time as a history of events, but we found that the 
time of events could only be understood as a history of purposes ; we now find that a 
history of choices can only be understood as a history of interpretations. 
We never quite get out of the problem of the regress of grounds for acts of will. 
There is no time in the distant past at which Pharaoh made a bad choice that he can 
be held responsible for. On the other hand, his "present" decision is a bad interpreta-
tion of his future, and in that sense his past is not adding up. In fact, this does provide 
a way of blaming Pharaoh for his act after all. The consequence, though, is that he is 
blamed less for a problem of choice than interpretation. We have now to investigate 
this third beginning. 
IV. FIRST AUTHOR OF INTERPRETATION 
In order for time and responsibility to emerge out of willed ends there must be 
some measure for transforming the finality of the future into new beginnings in the 
present and significant continuations of the past. That measure, Origen suggests, is 
the gospel correctly interpreted. If we learn how to read scripture, in particular how 
to read the fulfillment of prophesy in later events, we will know how to interpret the 
future of our history. 
1. Divine origin of scripture 
Origen's proof of the divine authorship of scripture is threefold, (a) Scripture has 
had more "success" in gaining followers in less time than Greek philosophy ever had 
(4.1.1). (b) The Jews are still waiting for their Messiah, and waiting — the stagnation 
of time — is a sign of falsity, (c) The prophesies of the Jews are fulfilled in the New 
Testament (4.1.3). On all three arguments, divine authorship is proved by the way in 
which history is being rewritten. Forget that we were first Jews and Egyptians and 
Greeks. The new text replaces all that, but the interpretation of the new text reveals 
the author who was the true author of history all along. To trace the text back to the 
original author therefore involves rereading the old by the new. It involves seeing the 
old text as having a double meaning which in different ways refers backward and 
forward. The beginning of the world's production is a word, and the subsequent time 
of the world is comprised of the succession of words which fall into the interpretative 
openings opened up by the first word. 
To see how the time of the text doubles, we have to consider the position of Bib-
lical hermeneutics that Origen is most well known for : the distinction between the 
literal and the figurative meanings of the scriptures. 
2. Literal and figurative interpretations 
Scripture is a text with "hidden" meaning (1.Preface.8). For example, passages 
that seem to imply that God has a material body must be read for their "deeper [or 
spiritual] meanings" (1.1.1, 1.1.9, 2.4.4). Interpretation is like a treasure hunt with 
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wisdom beneath the ground, and it is only with God's help that we know how to 
break the surface barrier (4.3.11). This last point shows just how tricky interpretation 
is ; we need God's help to break the code of the text, but that help itself is in the text. 
The danger is that the text that explains how to break the code of the text may itself 
be written in that very code. 
We need a test to decide which statements in the text should be taken literally and 
which should be taken spiritually. The test of interpretation is whether a literal under-
standing would lead to a contradiction. Some are logical/rational contradictions. Sto-
ries about the world being created in six days, or about evil resulting from eating an 
apple are so "silly" that any "reasonable man" would agree that they represent only a 
"semblance of history, not actual events" (4.3.1). There are also physical contradic-
tions, as when Adam hides from God's sight, and utilitarian contradictions, as when 
Mosaic laws tell people not to do things they would never have done anyway (like 
eating vulture) (4.2.9, 4.3.2). It is in temporal contradictions that we find the most 
complex cases of scriptures that cannot be taken literally. God did not literally "walk 
in paradise in the evening" (4.3.1). Likewise the law that people should sit all day 
long on the Sabbath, if taken literally, would imply a world too motionless to be pos-
sible (4.3.2). We find that "among the narratives which appear to be recorded literally 
there are inserted and interwoven others which cannot be accepted as historical, but 
which contain a spiritual meaning" (4.3.1, also 4.3.11). This principle is worth quot-
ing at length : 
The divine wisdom has arranged for certain stumbling blocks and interruptions of the his-
torical sense to be found therein [on the surface of the text], by inserting in the midst a 
number of impossibilities and incongruities in order that the very interruption of the narra-
tive might as it were present a barrier to the reader and lead him to refuse to proceed along 
the pathway of the ordinary meaning : and so by shutting us out and debarring us from that 
might recall us to the beginning of another way (4.2.9). 
There is much to be said about barriers and interruptions in the relation between 
temporality and literalness. Indeed, the problem of literalness is exactly the problem 
of what can count as "actual history". And this is the problem of the points of actual 
history at which spiritual or transcendental interpretations are inserted via textual in-
terruptions into the sequence of temporal events. Or in other words, what figurative 
interpretation does is to introduce a new rationality of history — not to abandon his-
tory in favor of a Platonic realm, but to give history a double sense. 
3. Two of everything 
The Old Testament makes promises of bodily rewards. But just as Pythagoreans 
think of numbers not physically but intellectually, we must read the book the other 
way (4.2.5, 2.11.4). Because the book can be read in two ways, it is "two books" 
(4.2.4). The first book "admonishes" those with "child souls" to desist from crimes 
(usually procreational crimes). This book is the surface text, the "bare letter", which 
vulgar people call the book itself. The second book announces spiritual doctrine to 
"those who are already departing from the letter" in the direction of the "living voice" 
and the "cities without" (4.2.4). The distinction between the letter and the living 
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voice is not a distinction between language and something else, but between two 
forms of language ; not a distinction between time and something else, but between 
dead time and living time. 
The readers of the second book are headed to the second city, which is found in 
the "other Israel" (4.3.7). The idea is not to take the material world and apportion half 
of it to another world later on, but is rather to create an entire parallel earth. In a 
strange way, the second city gives a clue to where the worlds before and after the 
temporal boundaries of our world (2.3.6) would lie. They lie in interpretation ; they 
lie in the narrative ; they lie in language. 
For the other city lies precisely in the same events that our cities lie in — not that 
the difference between worlds is "only" a difference of subjective interpretation, but 
that every event happens in a double world. This is also what prophesy consists of — 
not a paranormal true guess about the future, but the doubleness of interpretation. 
Prophesy is just the description of events in the world as events "over there". It is a 
distancing of events in relation to ourselves, so as to regard events as happening eter-
nally instead of transitorily, as living history instead of history incessantly dying 
away. The two worlds are composed of one and the same series of events, and both 
the eternal are the transitory senses of time must be found in that same series. 
4. Actual history. The only case study : Jewish history 
The history of the Jews plays a special role in Origen's text. On the one hand, 
this history is the content of those narratives in the scriptures that Origen thinks re-
quire special interpretation. Somewhere in the connections between the parts of this 
narrative lies the double history of our double world. In so far as historical narrative 
is by definition that which is to be overcome by Christian interpretation, every narra-
tive of actual history is in that sense narrative of Jewish history. On the other hand, 
all history of the Jews is to be reinterpreted as a merely preliminary and prophetic 
version, not to be taken literally, of an eternal order, namely the order of Christian-
ity.9 Christianity also has its events, but Christian history is already no longer factual 
history, but has passed into the atemporal order. The history of the Jews is not yet 
history, and the history of the Christians is no longer history, and the moment be-
tween, the moment in which scripture is written, is the moment in which interpreta-
tion goes in the two directions. One understands the meaning of prophesy "at the 
same time" as one knows Jesus, Origen says (4.1.6). The sameness of the time of the 
two meanings points to the paradox of time that we have seen before. If the later text 
decodes the earlier one, only thereby conferring spiritual meaning onto its predeces-
sor, then it gives those earlier texts their prophetic status retroactively ; the old texts 
did not in themselves have the power to foretell anything, but only got the power to 
have foretold events after those events occurred. They did prophesy, but only after 
9. Gerard E. CASPARY argues that Origen's allegorical exegesis is always an act of spiritual warfare against 
the Jews (Politics and Exegesis : Origen and the Two Swords, Berkeley : University of California Press, 
1979, p. 20). 
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they turned out to be true. They did come before Christ, but they did so only after 
Christ provided a way to interpret them. 
But there is another paradox. For all the elegance of the fulfillment of the prior 
text in the posterior (the fulfillment of history in the future), the Jews who preserved 
the Old Testament scripture did not of course believe that the meaning of the prophe-
sies were revealed in Christ's word. For the New Testament to update the Old is to 
deny that the latter stands on its own. If prophesy is the spring whose unwinding the 
Stoics identified with time, it would seem that history is being annulled again at its 
completion. Time has to be "vomited" out of the hearts of the ignorant once the se-
crets of the parables are revealed (3.1.13). Indeed there are some passages when Ori-
gen goes so far as to suggest that none of the historical narratives of scripture actually 
happened (4.2.9, though other passages make exceptions, 4.3.4).10 
All of this indicates the blockage that Origen's philosophy of time runs into at the 
question of how the past has significance for the present. That the past does have 
transcendental significance is of the essence in Origen's theory : that the past is also 
blocked out of existence by its very capacity to give eternal meaning to the present is 
just as essential. This might make it seem that Origen's philosophy of time fails, i.e. 
that at the point where he wants time to have significance it disappears into the eter-
nal, and at the point where he wants time to disappear in the eternal the eternal itself 
turns out to be nothing but a temporal unfolding of events. But my argument is that 
this failure is what should happen to a philosophy of time, that time is ontologically 
significant just when it is both an indicator of transcendental categories and an infil-
trator into those categories. 
5. The last reversal : time becomes, and infiltrates, the eternal 
What is in the eternal world that correct interpretation of historical narrative leads 
us to ? And why should historical narrative be a good way of encoding what is in the 
eternal world in the first place ? The answer to the second question is that "the prin-
ciple aim [of scripture] was to announce the connection that exists among spiritual 
events, those that have already happened and those that are yet to come to pass" 
(4.2.9). Particular personal histories may be a code, but what they encode is still his-
tory, still an order and connection of events.11 It is because the eternal realm is still a 
10. Harry Austryn WOLFSON says that "Origen lays down the rule that the literal sense of Scripture is to be re-
jected only when it is irrational and impossible [...]" (Philo, Cambridge : Harvard University Press, 1948, 
p. 159. See also John M. RlST, Eros and Psyche ; Studies in Plato, Plotinus, and Origen, Toronto : Univer-
sity of Toronto Press, 1964, p. 200.) It may be that it was Origen's intention to maintain a clear range of 
scriptures that do not require allegorical interpretation, but it is difficult to see how to prevent allegorical 
interpretation from encroaching on all texts. 
11. There are only so many ways to solve the relation between the temporally changing and the permanent as-
pects of reality ; we could assert separate realms of reality for temporal and eternal entities, or we could as-
sert different levels or hypostases of time-relations, or we could hold that time does not matter, or we could 
hold that the eternal is constituted within the temporal. I would not be able to do justice here to Paul C. 
PLASS's article "Timeless Time in Neoplatonism", The Modern Schoolman, 55, November 1977, p. 1-19, 
but in general, he is looking for the neoplatonic solution in the last of the possibilities above, as I am. See 
also Peter MANCHESTER'S equally complex and valuable "Time and Soul in Plotinus, III 7[45], 11", Di-
onysius, 2 (Dec 1978), p. 101-136. For an excellent examination of the second of the above possibilities, 
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historical realm that historical narratives of the Jews is a fitting surrogate. Hence, for 
example, the personal narrative of Abraham fathering Isaac should be in each detail 
of the narrative a representation of the order and connection of the history of the One 
eternally expressing itself in an image. The temporal order by which Abraham sleeps 
with Hagar before Sarah represents the conceptual order by which one must study 
Greek philosophy (the foreign harlot) before one can understand religion. In exactly 
the same way, the French Revolution, the life of Frederick Douglass, and maybe even 
the publication of this journal are all rearranging the structure of the eternal realm. 
The point is that the eternal realm has the same history in it as the temporal realm ; in 
a way it is just as temporal as this temporal realm. The difference is that interpreta-
tion of the eternal realm is that interpretation of the temporal realm which exhibits the 
universal significance of each event. The philosophers of history whom I referred to 
early in the paper as having a fully developed philosophy of time are content in say-
ing that there is in the end just one realm of events with both transitory and transcen-
dental significance. What distinguishes Origen from these philosophers is that Origen 
is not content when his search for the transcendental realm has not left the temporal 
behind. Origen at some level wants out of time, even though every step he takes to-
ward the eternal carries time along with it. I think perhaps Origen is right to be dis-
contented. While there is no way out of time, time itself, with its peculiar reversals, 
interruptions, and bunchings up into beginnings and ends, constitutes blockages, the 
only appropriate response to which is the desire to transcend history, to begin the 
world again. 
which shows that it might be the same as the fourth, see Robert S. BRUMBAUGH, "Time Passes : Platonic 
Variations", Review of Metaphysics, 33 (June 1980), p. 711-726. 
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